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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD,

Case No. 20041023-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISCOUNTED DEFENDANT'S
UNSWORN STATEMENT RECITING INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
AND UNQUALIFIED OPINION TESTIMONY
As set out in the State's opening brief at pp. 6, 8-14, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after finding that defendant had been lucid
and coherent at the plea hearing. The trial court thus concluded that defendant was
unimpaired by his recent consumption of alcohol:
I don't see anything on the, the tape that suggests to me that you
were impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the time we took the plea. I
mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or, or having
trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you seemed to understand all
of the questions that I put to you and your answers appeared to be articulate
and coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had something to drink, I
just don't think that that somehow impaired your ability to enter that plea on
the, on the day that you did.
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. I'm also going to
find that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. And you

may have been drinking but I just don't think that you were under the
influence of an [sic] alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of
understanding what was going on that day.
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, sir, to withdraw the
plea. And we'll leave the sentence imposed.
R41:66 (a copy is attached in Addendum B to the State's opening brief).
On appeal, the Beckstead majority overturned the trial court's finding, even though
at the plea hearing defendant himself had assured the trial court that he was not then
impaired, and even though it was undisputed that defendant exhibited no signs of
impairment during the thorough plea colloquy. State v. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, ^f
9-11, 100 P.3d 267. Notwithstanding the total absence of any evidence that defendant
was impaired as a result of his recent alcohol consumption, the Beckstead majority
refused to uphold the trial court's finding because the trial court did not ask defendant at
the plea hearing how much alcohol he had consumed and when. Id. at ^ 10-12. Absent
this explicit questioning, the Beckstead majority opined that the trial court "did not strictly
comply with its rule 11 obligations, and should have allowed [defendant] to withdraw his
plea."/J. atf ll. 1
Agreeing with the Beckstead majority, defendant points to his own unsworn
statement at the motion to withdraw hearing that a jail intake officer had told defendant
that he was "highly intoxicated" on the day of the plea hearing. See Resp. Br. at 16

l

See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (a copy is attached to Pet. Br. at addendum C).
2

(quoting R41:64). That unsworn statement was both inadmissible hearsay and an
unqualified opinion. Although the Beckstead majority did not rely on defendant's
unsworn statement in reversing the trial court, defendant suggests that the trial court
improperly discounted his unsworn statement when it determined that he knowingly
entered his guilty plea. Resp. Br. at 16-17. Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the
trial court properly rejected his unsworn statement for the reasons noted—it recounted
inadmissible hearsay and unqualified opinion testimony.
Moreover, defendant has not and cannot show any clear error in the trial court's
findings that he knowingly entered his guilty plea merely by citing his unsworn statement.
Defendant's self-serving, unsworn statement simply cannot overcome evidence the trial
court properly relied on—its own observation and recollection of defendant's lucid plea
hearing performance. See R41:66. Rather, to succeed in his apparent sufficiency
challenge, defendant must "comb[] the record for and compil[e] all the evidence" that
supports the trial court's finding that he was not impaired when he entered his plea.
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, lj 21, 54 P.3d 1177. See also
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (appellant must marshal the evidence
"if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is
extremely fact-sensitive"). Then, defendant must demonstrate that the marshaled
evidence was legally insufficient to support the challenged finding. Wilson Supply, Inc.,
2002 UT 94, ^f 21. Because defendant has not even attempted to meet his strict

3

marshaling burden, he fails to demonstrate error, let alone clear error, in the trial court's
findings. It necessarily follows that defendant has failed to support the Beckstead
majority's reversal of the trial court's ruling.
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS OF NON-IMPAIRMENT
WERE CONSISTENT WITH HIS COHERENT PLEA HEARING
BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY ENTERED:
THE BECKSTEAD MAJORITY'S CONTRARY HOLDING SHOULD
THEREFORE BE OVERTURNED
Defendant further asserts that due to his recent alcohol consumption, he was
"unable to know and understand" his rights, even though the trial court "went through a
complete Rule 11 colloquy." Resp. Br. at 11. According to defendant, "[a] defendant that
is under the influence of alcohol cannot know, understand, or comprehend the
significance of any of the [] Rule 11 requirements." Resp. Br. at 17. Defendant's
suggestion that a defendant who may be under the influence of alcohol or another
intoxicant can never enter a knowing guilty plea is refuted by relevant case law set out in
the State's opening brief. See Pet. Br. at 15-21. According to these authorities, the
primary concern in a case where a defendant has recently ingested an intoxicant is
whether the record supports a finding of non-impairment at the time the guilty plea is
entered. See, e.g., United States v. Savin-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 2000)
(observing that cases from both the First Circuit Court of Appeals and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals focus on a defendant's plea hearing behavior). Cf. State v. Corwell,
2005 UT 28,118, 114 P.3d 569 ("[T]he test of whether a district court strictly complies
4

with rule 11(e) is . . . whether the record adequately supports the district court's
conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of
rule 11(e)"). This majority view recognizes the reality that many people drink alcohol
and are unimpaired for purposes of entering please and making other important decisions.
These authorities also recognize, at least implicitly, that the amount of alcohol that one
can drink without being impaired will vary from person to person. Asking how much
alcohol one has had to drink and when will rarely inform the court whether a defendant is
impaired to the point that he cannot enter a knowing guilty plea. See Pet. Br. at 15-21
(analyzing cases). Contrary to defendant's reasoning—and the Beckstead
majority's—even though it may be preferable to determine the type and quantity of
intoxicant recently consumed, "practical judgments can usually be made[,]" without this
information. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 268-269. See also Pet. Br. at 16-21 and cases
cited therein.
Defendant wholly fails to challenge or distinguish the State's authorities,
emphasizing instead case law instructing that a defendant must be competent to enter a
guilty plea. See Resp. Br. at 18 (discussing e.g., York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590 (Utah
App. 1994); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)). The State does not dispute the
accuracy of this general proposition. However, as set forth above, defendant's implicit
assertion that defendants who have recently ingested intoxicants are necessarily rendered
incompetent to plead guilty is contrary to both the majority view and common sense.

5

Finally, to the extent that defendant asserts that "[r]ule 11 is violated by an
omission of several words/' this Court has expressly rejected such reasoning and has
overturned the authority upon which defendant relies. See Resp. Br. at 19-20 (citing State
v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101 (Utah App. 2002), rev'd, 2004 UT 46, 94 P.3d 268). Indeed, this
Court has made plain that strict compliance with rule 11(e) does not require a
"mechanical[] reci[tation]" of the rule and that all "the concepts found in rule 11(e) may
be communicated to the defendant using a variety of means." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 14.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant fails to identify any compelling reason that
the Beckstead majority should be affirmed. Moreover, the Beckstead majority's focus on
formalistic inquiry is a clear departure from this Court's policy-based interpretation of
rule 11 and its focus on a defendant's comprehensive understanding of the plea.
Therefore, the State respectfully asks the Court to overturn Beckstead and affirm the trial
court's well-supported denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on/^J September 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
^Assistant Attorney General
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